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ARTICLES




The highly charged issue of school prayer returned to the Supreme
Court in a somewhat unusual form during the 1984 Term.' The issue
was whether an Alabama statute which authorized a one-minute period
of silence in public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer" was
constitutionally valid. The Court's narrow holding, which set aside the
statute on grounds related to Alabama's legislative purpose, was un-
remarkable except to those, on both sides, who demanded a more clear-
cut vindication of their position.2 But the Court's treatment of silent
prayer has important implications, not only for religious exercises, but
also for other government speech before unconsenting audiences.'
This Article explores some of those implications. The Article does
not suggest that the Court intended or even focused on the consequences
that appear to flow from its treatment of school prayer. What is set forth
in these pages is admittedly a nontraditional view-or at least an exten-
sion of traditional views-of the Free Speech and Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. But it is hardly novel for unwitting implications of
the Court's work to control future judicial results.4 This Article there-
fore considers the meaning of the silent prayer decision, its historical
antecedents, and finally, its broader implications for first amendment
theory.
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University. A.B., 1959, Columbia University;
J.D., 1962, University of Chicago.
1. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
2. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at B5, col. 1; TIME, June 17, 1985, at 52.
3. See infra notes 117-143 and accompanying text.
4. For instance, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955), originally calling
for student "admission to the public schools ... on a nonracial basis," eventually led to the
invalidation of a statutory ban on racially based student assignments. North Carolina State
Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
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The Article begins with an examination of the school prayer deci-
sions and finds that they are grounded in "freedom of conscience and
belief."5 It is suggested that if freedom of belief is undermined when
individuals are forced to listen to religious speech by government, it may
be similarly undermined when one is required to listen to nonreligious
speech by government.6 This Article also examines earlier cases protect-
ing freedom of conscience and explores the implications of those cases.7
Finally, the Article discusses both the limitations on freedom of belief
and the remedies that may be available for constitutional violations.8
I. The Jaffree Case: A Search for Meaning
In Wallace v. Jaffree,9 the Court addressed the problem of state-
sanctioned silent prayer in public schools. A parent in that case filed suit
on behalf of his three school children, challenging the validity of an Ala-
bama statute which authorized a one-minute period of silence "for medi-
tation or voluntary prayer." 10 Justice Stevens, writing for five members
of the Court, identified freedom of conscience and belief as "the central
liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First Amendment."11 He
then applied the first prong of the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman 12
and concluded that the "sole" purpose of the Alabama statute was to
express "the State's endorsement of prayer activities" in the public
schools. 13
Although a finding of unconstitutionality was required by the
Court's determination that the sole purpose of the statute was to endorse
religious activity, a majority of the Court seemed prepared to uphold a
"straightforward" moment-of-silence statute. 4 Three members of the
Court argued that the Alabama provision should be upheld despite its
5. See infra notes 9-33 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 40-44, 117-143 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 45-92 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 144-164 and accompanying text.
9. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
10. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1986). Two related statutes provided for vocal prayer,
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1986), and for the observance of a moment of silence "for
meditation." ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1986).
11. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 50.
12. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test provides that a statute must: (1) have a secular pur-
pose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not cause
excessive entanglement between religion and government. Id. at 612-13.
13. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 60. The Court, in reaching this conclusion, relied on admissions
of a religious purpose by the statute's chief sponsor and on the fact that a pre-existing statute
had already authorized meditation without mentioning voluntary prayer.
14. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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peculiar legislative history.15 In addition, two other members would
have held constitutionally valid a statute evincing a secular purpose. 6
Justice O'Connor believed that constitutional requirements would be sat-
isfied by a "moment of silence law.., drafted and implemented so as to
permit prayer, meditation, and reflection.., without endorsing one alter-
native over the others... ,"17 Justice Powell agreed that such laws "can-
not be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal prayer"' ,
and said he "would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose."19 Even Justice Stevens' opinion acknowledged
the distinctiveness of silent prayer and left open'the possibility of "pro-
tecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an ap-
propriate moment of silence during the school day."20
The emerging majority view would thus allow the states to set aside
a moment of the regular school day "so as to permit prayer, meditation,
and reflection ... without endorsing one alternative over the others."2
Under this approach, it seems clear that silent prayer can be brought into
public school classrooms. Since the Jaffree Court unanimously rejected
an attempt to reintroduce vocal prayer into Alabama schools,22 the
emerging majority view plainly invites attention to the distinction be-
tween vocal prayer and silent prayer.
In a concurring opinion in Jaffree, Justice O'Connor offered the fol-
lowing distinction between vocal prayers and state-sponsored moments
of silence:
First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious .... Second,
a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compro-
mise his or her beliefs. During a moment of silence, a student who
objects to prayer is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not com-
pelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others.23
The first point is unpersuasive. The fact that a moment of silence is not
"inherently" religious can hardly be dispositive. There is no reason to
15. 472 U.S. at 84, 90-91 (Burger, .. , White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
16. Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 67 (O'Connor, 3., concurring).
17. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, this rationale
"suggests that moment of silence laws in many States should pass Establishment Clause scru-
tiny because they do not favor the child who chooses to pray ... over the child who chooses to
meditate or reflect." Id.
18. Id. at 62 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 66 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell believed that "a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute" would satisfy the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. Id.
20. Id. at 59.
21. d at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (affirming the invalidation of ALA. CODE § 16-
1-20.2).
23. Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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doubt that in some classrooms the participation in prayer during official
moments of silence will be just as great as the participation once was in
vocal prayer. Furthermore, the students who pray may make their
prayer known to classmates either by their actions during the moment of
silence or by explicit statements afterwards.24 Where such participation
occurs, and is known to occur, it makes little sense to suggest that the
moment of silence is nonreligious or arguably nonreligious.
Justice O'Connor's second point, regarding the beliefs of individual
students, is more cogent. In the case of vocal prayer, students who
choose not to participate are forced to listen to the prayer unless they
remove themselves from the room. Since school attendance is required,
withdrawal from the classroom during prayer is likely to be conspicuous;
and some students may, for that reason, be coerced into listening to the
prayer. When prayers are silent, on the other hand, neither those who
pray nor those who decline will be forced to listen to any prayer which
might offend their religious or nonreligious beliefs. What seems to distin-
guish silent from vocal prayer, therefore, is the noninfringement of the
rights of listeners when no words are spoken.
An analysis of the vocal prayer cases supports the view that listener
rights are of critical concern to the Court. In Engel v. Vitale,25 the first
of the school prayer cases, the Supreme Court set forth the rationale for
finding a violation of the Establishment Clause. In that case, school prin-
cipals were directed to require each class to read aloud a prayer, com-
posed by the State Board of Regents, at the beginning of the school day.26
In concluding that it was "no part of the business of government to com-
pose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite,"'27
the Supreme Court relied on two basic principles. First, the Court em-
phasized the lack of state power "to prescribe by law any particular form
of prayer" to be used "in carrying on any program of governmentally
sponsored religious activity."2 Second, the Court observed that "[w]hen
the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind
a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain."29 This coercive pressure to conform is particularly troublesome
24. Even if overt religious behavior might invalidate an otherwise lawful meditation exer-
cise, subsequent student admissions of silent prayer surely would not. See supra notes 15-20
and accompanying text.
25. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
26. Id. at 422
27. Id. at 425.
28. Id. at 430.
29. Id. at 431.
in the context of a captive audience, and the Court recognized that prob-
lem in its next decision on school prayer.
Abington School District v. Schempp30 dealt with government provi-
sions which mandated Bible reading in public schools but permitted the
excusal of students upon their parents' request. The Court noted that
"[t]hese exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of stu-
dents who are required by law to attend school,"31 and held that in light
of Engel the excusal provision could not save the program.32 Although
Schempp did not involve a state-composed prayer, as the Engel case had,
the official prescription of religious activity and pressure on a captive
audience were sufficient to invalidate the program.33
Since Engel and Schempp involved both officially prescribed reli-
gious activity and pressure on a captive audience to conform, it was un-
certain whether one of those elements standing alone would trigger a
finding of unconstitutionality.34 But later cases suggest that when the two
elements are separated, state prescription of prayer, independent of coer-
cive pressure, need not be constitutionally fatal.
Marsh v. Chambers35 raised the question whether a state legisla-
ture's practice of opening each legislative day with the recitation of
prayer violated the First Amendment.36 The Court, in refusing to invali-
date the practice, cited the long history of legislative prayer in the United
States as evidence of the Framers' intent.37 It also offered a policy basis
for distinguishing legislative prayer from prayer in school: "Here, the
individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not
readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' . . . or peer pressure
.... "38 Equally important, members of the legislature are frequently
absent during floor activity, including the invocation, and their absence
does not necessarily reflect their religious views. There was thus no cap-
tive audience problem in Marsh and little or no "indirect coercive pres-
sure" to conform.39
30. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
31. Id. at 223.
32. Id. at 224-25.
33. Id. at 223.
34. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
35. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
36. The prayer exercise was conducted by a chaplain who was chosen biennially by the
Executive Board of the Legislative Council and paid with public funds.
37. 463 U.S. at 786.
38. Id. at 792.
39. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (1984), noting that "Congress has
directed the President to proclaim a National Day of Prayer each year" and that "Presi-
dents have repeatedly issued such Proclamations." Justice O'Connor has observed that
Summer 1987] SCHOOL PRAYER
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Finally, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sep-
aration of Church and State' further supports the view that pressure on
a captive audience was a critical element in the school prayer cases. Ad-
dressing an issue of standing to sue, the Court in Valley Forge noted that
the Schempp plaintiffs had standing because in that case "impressionable
schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were
forced to assume special burdens to avoid them." 1 Although the Court
has not been consistent in its application of standing requirements to es-
tablishment clause cases,42 Valley Forge confirms the importance of the
captive audience in the school prayer cases.
The focus on the rights of listeners in Jaffree and other prayer cases
has important first amendment implications. When the cases are viewed
from the perspective of the listener's freedom of conscience, as Jaffree
suggests, they appear to yield not only the anti-establishment clause rule
for which they are usually cited, but also an implied principle of un-
coerced listening. Of course, the cases dealt specifically with prayer and
at a minimum protect against government imposition of certain religious
speech on a captive audience. However, this protection is grounded
upon freedom of belief, which Jaffree identified as "the central liberty
that unifies the various clauses in the First Amendment." 3 It is pre-
cisely because freedom of belief can be compromised by forced listening
that vocal prayer is treated differently from silent prayer. But while first
amendment protection for freedom of conscience certainly embraces reli-
gious beliefs, it is not necessarily limited to such beliefs. The principle of
uncoerced listening, therefore, cannot easily be confined to religious
speech and may potentially protect against forced listening to various
forms of ideological indoctrination by government.' Before addressing
this issue further, it will be useful to examine the historical roots of the
principle in order to understand better the scope of its potential applica-
tion. An historical overview suggests a surprisingly broad degree of sup-
port for the principle of uncoerced listening.
"[p]residential proclamations are distinguishable from school prayer in that they are received
in a non-coercive setting and are primarily directed at adults, who presumably are not readily
susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination." Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 81 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
40. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
41. Id. at 486-87 n.22.
42. Compare Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) with Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
43. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 50.
44. See infra note 139 for examples of such indoctrination.
SCHOOL PRAYER
11. Roots of the Principle
A. The Early Case Law
West Virginia v. Barnette45 imposed the first significant restrictions
on officially mandated speech. Barnette involved a school board provi-
sion which required all students to participate in saluting the flag, and
subjected them to expulsion for failure to comply.46 Jehovah's Witnesses
sought to enjoin enforcement of the provision because they believed the
pledge would violate the biblical command against bowing before graven
images. The Court held that individuals could not be required to salute
the flag, but it expressly declined to limit its decision to claims based on
religion. 7 Instead, the Court ruled that no person objecting to the flag
salute, for either religious or nonreligious reasons, could be required to
participate in the ceremony:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein ....
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute ... invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control.4"
The Barnette decision clearly protects the right of individuals not to
declare a political or religious belief. Whether it also protects their right
not to listen to declarations of belief by the government is less certain.
The opinion stated that no official can force a declaration of beliefs or
"prescribe what shall be orthodox."4 9 This dictum clearly supports the
principle of uncoerced listening. However, the holding in Barnette was
more narrow. The Court's judgment simply enjoined enforcement of
provisions requiring "participation" in the flag salute,"° and it is not clear
whether coerced listening is a form of participation that was withdrawn
from state authority.51
45. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
46. The provision stated that "all teachers . . .and pupils in [West Virginia Public
Schools] ... shall be required to participate in the salute honoring the nation represented by
the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an act of insubordi-
nation, and shall be dealt with accordingly." Id. at 626 n.2.
47. Id. at 634.
48. Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. See supra note 46.
51. Lower federal courts have defined the right of nonparticipation to encompass more
than a refusal to make a declaration of belief. See, eg., Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1973) (ruling that students could remain seated during the flag salute). A broad definition
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Coerced listening was more plainly a matter of concern in Kovacs v.
Cooper.2 Kovacs involved a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use on
city streets of any sound truck or other amplifier emitting "loud and rau-
cous noises." The Court concluded that "the need for reasonable protec-
tion.., from the distracting noises of vehicles equipped with such sound
amplifying devices justifies the ordinance."
53
Although Kovacs emphasized the city's interest in maintaining com-
munity tranquility, the ordinance apparently did not regulate disturbing
noises emanating from other sources. The Court, therefore, acknowl-
edged a separate governmental interest in protecting captive auditors
from speech they were unwilling to hear: "The unwilling listener is not
like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot
be made to take it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless
to escape this interference ... except through the protection of the mu-
nicipality. ' 54 Kovacs thus recognized the state's power not only to pro-
tect local tranquility but, more significantly for first amendment
purposes, to protect captive auditors from coerced listening.
B. The Right to Receive
For many years freedom of speech was viewed almost exclusively
from the perspective of those seeking to disseminate information or ideas.
Speakers and distributors were protected, but little attention was paid at
first to the rights of the listener.5 Eventually, the Supreme Court came
to view the First Amendment as protecting the entire communication,
including the right to receive information and ideas.
The issue was squarely presented in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.56 In Virginia Phar-
macy, a consumer group challenged a state law providing that
pharmacists were guilty of unprofessional conduct if they advertised the
price of prescription drugs. The Court held that prospective recipients of
the information had standing to assert a first amendment interest in the
seems likely to embrace the right to resist forced listening, but the issue appears not to have
been litigated. See Frain v. Baron, 307 F.Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), in which public schools
voluntarily recognized such a right.
52. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
53. Id. at 89.
54. Id. at 86-87.
55. See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941). The work of
Alexander Meiklejohn, published nearly 30 years after the Supreme Court's entry into the first
amendment arena, was instrumental in focusing attention on the rights of listeners. See A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), reprinted in
A. MEIKLE.OHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 3-89 (1965).
56. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
dissemination of drug prices: "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing
speaker. But where a speaker exists... the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."5 7
In Board of Education v. Pico,58 a plurality of the Court applied the
"right to receive"59 to the removal of materials from a public school li-
brary. The school board in Pico had ordered the removal of certain
books from the high school and junior high school libraries because the
books were thought to be "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semetic
[sic], and just plain ftlthy." 60 A group of students brought suit, alleging
that the Board's action violated their rights under the First Amendment.
Although only a minority of the Supreme Court endorsed the right to
receive material in school libraries, a majority of the Court agreed that
the First Amendment imposes some limits on state power to remove
books from public schools. 1 Justice Brennan, writing for four members
of the Court, relied on Barnette's ban on the prescription of orthodoxy in
concluding that a school board may not remove books for the purpose of
suppressing ideas disfavored by board members:
If a Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, or-
dered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republi-
cans, few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional
rights of the students denied access to those books.... To permit
such intentions [of denying access to disfavored ideas] would be to
encourage the precise sort of officially prescribed orthodoxy un-
equivocally condemned in Barnette.62
Justice Rehnquist, although dissenting under the facts in Pico, acknowl-
edged that he would "cheerfully concede" 63 that books could not be re-
moved because they advocated racial equality or other ideas with which
the school board disagreed.'
The recognition of the listener's first amendment rights in Virginia
Pharmacy was an important step in the development of the principle of
uncoerced listening. Acceptance of a constitutional right to receive in-
57. Id. at 756.
58. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
59. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
60. 457 U.S. at 857 (citing Pico v. Board of Ed., Island Trees Union Free School Dist.,
474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
61. Not surprisingly, no agreement was reached on precisely what those limits are.
62. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71 (plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Although Justice Brennan said that the school board "might" be able to defend a
claim of unfettered discretion in matters of curriculum, it is highly unlikely that a curriculum
decision based clearly on race or political party affiliation could survive constitutional attack.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980);
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
Summer 19871 SCHOOL PRAYER
772 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 14:763
formation, although limited to cases involving a willing speaker, suggests
that listeners rather than government should control their exposure to
material in the public domain. Nevertheless, Virginia Pharmacy fell
short of recognizing full autonomy for listeners. Because the litigants in
that case did not seek protection against the speaker, the decision only
guaranteed access to speech rather than a right to be insulated from it.
The Pico case similarly addressed access to speech, but Pico is also signifi-
cant for its apparent reaffirmation of West Virginia v. Barnette. Pico, like
Barnette, reaches both religious and nonreligious claims, and strongly
suggests that Barnette's ban on the prescription of orthodoxy has far
greater force than would be attributed to casual dictum.65 Pico did not,
however, address the difficult problems surrounding the application of
the principle of uncoerced listening to public schools, since that case in-
volved neither a willing speaker nor an unwilling listener.
C. Protecting Captive Auditors
The principle of uncoerced listening has been enforced in a number
of cases upholding speech restrictions specifically designed to protect
captive auditors. Rowan v. Post Office Department66 presents a good ex-
ample. In Rowan, the Court upheld a federal statute providing that per-
sons who received mail which they deemed "sexually provocative" could
have their names removed from the sender's mailing list and insulate
themselves from future mailings.67 In ruling that "no one has a right to
press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient,"6 the Court relied ex-
plicitly on the interests of captive auditors: "Weighing the highly impor-
tant right to communicate ... against the very basic right to be free from
sights, sounds, and tangible matter we do not want, it seems to us that a
mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive
addressee."69
Two characteristics of Rowan made it a relatively easy case for pro-
tecting the rights of listeners. First, individual recipients could reject un-
wanted messages without interfering with the freedom of anyone else to
receive those messages.70 Second, the government made no distinction
65. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71 (plurality opinion).
66. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
67. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1970).
68. 397 U.S. at 738.
69. Id. at 736-37.
70. Although the statute permitted parents to request removal of the names of minor
children from a mailing list, the Court did not address "the right of older children to receive
materials through the mail." Id. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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between different types of speech; instead, it simply recognized the power
of individuals to reject any message they deemed offensive.
More difficult questions arise when captive auditors are protected
only from selected speech, or are protected at the expense of other listen-
ers who wish to hear the speech.7' Nevertheless, government power to
protect a captive audience was sustained in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,7" despite the absence of the Rowan characteristics. Lehman up-
held a city's refusal to sell advertising space on municipal buses to polit-
ical candidates, although the city sold space to commercial and public-
service advertisers.73 A four-member plurality of the Court justified the
regulation on the basis of the city's interest in minimizing the "chances of
abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a cap-
tive audience."'74 In a separate opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the
Constitution not only permitted, but in fact required, the action taken by
the city: "[T]he right of commuters to be free from forced intrusions on
their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public
transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this cap-
tive audience."75
Cases like Lehman and Rowan, which extend beyond religious
speech and explicitly protect captive auditors, lend strong support to the
principle of uncoerced listening. Although the Lehman dissenters ob-
jected to "the city's preference for bland commercialism and noncontro-
versial public service messages over 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'
debate on public issues,"76 a preference for noncontroversial speech is
consistent with the aim of protecting captive auditors. In the context of a
captive audience, blandness may be less objectionable than ideological
force-feeding. The school prayer cases were based on that assumption,
and Lehman applied the same reasoning to nonreligious speech. But
while Lehman and Rowan gave legal status to the principle of uncoerced
listening, these decisions did not infuse the principle with constitutional
status. Instead, state and federal legislative power, not the First Amend-
71. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
72. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
73. Lehman, a candidate for the Ohio General Assembly, sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against the refusal of advertising space on the Shaker Heights Rapid Transit System.
The advertising space was managed by Metromedia, Inc. which, pursuant to its contract with
the City of Shaker Heights, did not accept any political advertising for placement in the transit
cars.
74. 418 U.S. at 302-04 (plurality opinion).
75. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Douglas provided the
fifth vote in support of the Court's judgment.
76. Id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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ment, afforded the basis for protecting captive auditors."
D. Releasing Students From Public School
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,78 the Court recognized the constitutional sta-
tus of the principle of uncoerced listening, but attempted to limit its deci-
sion to claims based on religion. The issue in Yoder was whether a state
could enforce its compulsory school attendance laws against Amish chil-
dren who, for religious reasons, refused to attend school beyond the
eighth grade. The Court, noting that the values taught in high school
were "in marked variance with Amish values,"'79 held that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments barred the state from requiring Amish parents
to enroll their children in high school.8" However, the opinion sought to
confine constitutional protection to listeners whose claims were grounded
in religious belief: "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may
not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education
if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of
the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief."81
The Yoder case clearly shows that value-based objections to coerced
listening are cognizable under the First Amendment even when the
speech, unlike that in the school prayer cases, is wholly secular in na-
ture. 2 The opinion stated that the objections themselves must be rooted
in religious belief;" yet what qualifies as religious belief for this purpose
is far from self-evident.84 Furthermore, Yoder says only that a "way of
life" must be based on religious belief in order "to have the protection of
the Religion Clauses."8 " However, a nonreligious claimant need not rely
on a "way of life" and would not necessarily invoke "the protection of
the Religion Clauses."86 A claim could instead be grounded, as in Bar-
nette and Pico, in other provisions of the First Amendment. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,87 which recognized a constitutional right to withdraw
from public schools, indicates that such a nonreligious claim might well
77. The same holds true for FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See also Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and the opinion of Justice Douglas-approved by Lehman-
in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952).
78. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
79. Id. at 211.
80. Id. at 234-36.
81. Id. at 215.
82. Id. at 210-11.
83. Id. at 215.
84. See infra notes 101-116 and accompanying text.
85. 406 U.S. at 215.
86. Id.
87. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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be upheld .8  Thus, the First Amendment protects against forced listen-
ing to religious speech,89 or to secular speech that conflicts with religious
belief,90 and permits protection against forced listening to any speech. 91
Furthermore, as the Pierce case shows, no quantum leap is required to
extend constitutional protection to cases of coerced listening to secular
speech that conflicts with nonreligious beliefs.92
I. Implications of the Principle
The principle of uncoerced listening will have important implica-
tions even if the Court does not extend it beyond the contours of earlier
decisions. The principle applies generally to government-mandated
speech before a captive audience.93 It is no accident, however, that most
of the cases from Barnette to Yoder have involved a public school setting.
Forced listening, whether to prayer or to political indoctrination, raises
first amendment issues of the most delicate order in that context, and
public schools are accordingly a primary focus of analysis in this Article.
Nevertheless, the principle of uncoerced listening has potential applica-
tion to a number of other state and federal institutions, including military
installations, prisons and, in some instances, public hospitals.94 Initially,
three issues warrant discussion: (1) the applicability of the principle of
uncoerced listening to nonreligious speech, (2) the limits governing the
principle, and (3) the remedies available for violations of the principle.
It is important to distinguish the principle of uncoerced listening
from general prohibitions on government speech. Some commentators
have proposed a broad restriction on official communications, fearing
88. Pierce involved a military academy as well as parochial schools and rejected "any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public [school] teachers.... ." Id. at 535. Although the opinion was laced with notions of
substantive due process, it has been accepted by the Court more recently as a first amendment
decision. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). However, Pierce left open
two important questions: (1) whether parents who enroll their children in public school can
continue to "direct" their education, and (2) whether private schools can be required to offer
the same curriculum as public schools. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)
(assuming, without deciding, that the First Amendment protects the right of parents to enroll
their children in private schools which teach views to which the parents adhere).
89. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
90. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
91. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Rowan v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
92. See infra notes 117-143 and accompanying text.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 99-143 for discussion of the kinds of speech gov-
erned by the principle.
94. See infra note 151.
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that absent such a restriction the government might "drown out" private
speech or "falsify consent" of private citizens. 5 These proposals impose
much broader constraints than does the principle of uncoerced listening.
When objections are based on the power to dominate the marketplace or
on similar theories,9 6 it is largely irrelevant whether the government
speaks to a captive audience.97 Under the principle of uncoerced listen-
ing, the element of captivity is always relevant and is usually crucial to
the substantive rights of the listener.
The broader theories for restricting government speech also lead to
different remedies when a constitutional violation occurs. Because under
these theories it is the speech itself which is offensive rather than the
conditions under which it is delivered, the logical remedy is to prohibit
the communication. Ironically, this remedy would limit access to infor-
mation and ideas and would thereby restrict the listener as well as the
speaker. The principle of uncoerced listening, on the other hand, will
generally call for a more narrowly focused remedy. Since the captive
auditor's objection is to ideological force-feeding, the remedy should or-
dinarily be to eliminate the captivity rather than the speech.9" This rem-
edy would protect the right of listeners to resist ideological
indoctrination, but would not interfere with the speech, which might
serve an important governmental purpose, or with the rights of listeners
who wish to hear it.
A. Applicability of the Principle
In addressing the implications of the principle of uncoerced listen-
ing, it is important to determine the kinds of speech that might trigger
the principle. If all government speech came within the scope of the
principle, some public institutions would be unable to perform their prin-
cipal mission and might be unable to function at all. But while certain
speech falls outside the scope of the principle of uncoerced listening, it is
clear that decisions like Jaffree and Engel, which protect captive auditors
from religious speech, extend beyond formal prayer exercises. At a mini-
95. See Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979); see also M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983); Shif-
frin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
96. See M. YUDOF, supra note 95, at 199.
97. But see M. YUDOF, supra note 95, at 169 (presence of a captive audience may be "a
factor").
98. See infra text accompanying notes 153-164. Exceptions can be found, as in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), where it is impossible to eliminate the captivity without stigma-
tizing the listener. The Engel case also states that in some circumstances, official prescription
of prayer might violate the Establishment Clause even without a showing of "direct" pressure
to conform. Id. at 430.
mum, such decisions reach various forms of religious advocacy and
proselytizing. 99
A more difficult question is whether the constitutional principle of
uncoerced listening applies to wholly nonreligious speech. 1" Although
Wisconsin v. Yoder t 01 can be interpreted as confining first amendment
protection of listeners to cases involving religious speech or speech that
conflicts with religious belief,102 the ultimate rule is likely to be more
expansive than Yoder implies. First, even if protection were limited to
religious speech, the Court would have to define "religion" in a way
which did not produce discrimination against minority sects. 103 United
States v. Seeger 1" illustrates the point. The Seeger case examined a sec-
tion of the conscription laws which exempted from combat service those
persons "who, by reason of religious training and belief, [were] conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form."' 1 5 The statute de-
fined "religious training and belief" as an individual's "belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but [excluding] essentially political, sociologi-
cal, or philosophical views .... ",1 ' 6 This definition raised serious consti-
tutional questions since it appeared to discriminate in favor of some
religions and against others. 1 7 The Court avoided the constitutional
problem by giving the statute a sweeping interpretation which obliterated
the apparent distinction between theistic and nontheistic beliefs:
A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admit-
tedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory defi-
nition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to
classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding
others .... 108
In applying this "parallel place" test to the facts in Seeger, the Court
99. A statute which required the posting of the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls
was invalidated in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). No doubt the same result would be
reached if the government attempted to "preach the word of God" in the classroom in the way
that private citizens are entitled to do on city streets. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,
292 (1951).
100. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
101. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
102. Id. at 215.
103. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1943).
104. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
105. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456G) (Supp. V 1964).
106. Id.
107. Cf Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.l1 (1961) ("Among religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of
God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethnic Culture, Secular Humanism and others.").
108. 380 U.S. at 176.
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quoted theologian Paul Tillich109 for the proposition that if "that word
[God] has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the
depths of your life,... of your ultimate concern, of what you take seri-
ously without any reservation."' 10
The Seeger case illustrates the potential breadth of the principle of
uncoerced listening even when confined to religious speech. Although
Seeger involved statutory interpretation, the decision has strong constitu-
tional overtones. Religion has traditionally been defined broadly,"1' be-
cause a narrow definition would create serious first amendment problems
by discriminating against minority sects."12 Although some commenta-
tors have suggested that a narrower definition be used for establishment
clause cases than for free exercise cases, 113 the Court has not adopted
such a dual approach. 4 Furthermore, the principle of uncoerced listen-
ing can be enforced through free exercise claims as easily as through anti-
establishment claims." 5 But if religion is defined, as it was in Seeger, to
embrace matters of "ultimate concern" or matters which occupy a "par-
allel place" to traditional theistic beliefs, the principle of uncoerced lis-
tening will offer captive auditors substantial protection against
government speech which is arguably religious." 6 In short, a broad defi-
nition of religion is needed to avoid religious preferences, and a broad
definition provides significant protection to captive auditors.
109. See P. TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1967).
110. 380 U.S.at 187 (quoting P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948))
(emphasis omitted).
111. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); Founding Church of
Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People x. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
112. In the Seeger case, for instance, a literal reading of the statute would favor theistic
beliefs over nontheistic beliefs. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a
state requirement that public officials declare their belief in the existence of God).
113. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28 (1978); Note, Toward A
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978).
114. A dual definition of religion is not easily reconciled with the language of the First
Amendment, which proscribes laws "respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Proponents of this approach would apparently
interpret the word "thereof" to refer to something different from the word "religion".
115. The principle was enforced through the Free Exercise Clause in Yoder and through
the Establishment Clause in Jaffree. Seeger invoked both clauses.
116. See Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1031,
1067 (1963), stating that it is not the function of public schools "to indoctrinate students in
any system of beliefs and values that rests on a claim of insight into ultimate truth with
respect to the meaning and purpose of life." See also Note, Freedom of Religion and Science
Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE. L.J. 515, 536-38 (1978), contending that instruction in
evolutionary theory, which arguably touches on matters of "ultimate concern," burdens the
free exercise of religion in much the same way as does the high school instruction in Wisconsin
v. Yoder.
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But while the principle of uncoerced listening has important impli-
cations even when limited to religious speech, it is unlikely that the prin-
ciple can be so narrowly confined. If Seeger calls for a broad definition of
religion, Welsh v. United States" 7 suggests an extension of protection
beyond religious claims alone. In Welsh, as in Seeger, the Supreme Court
ddressed the statutory exemption from combat service for persons con-
scietiously opposed to war "by reason of religious training and belief.""' 8
Faced with an individual who disavowed any reliance on religious be-
liefs, 119 a plurality of the Court said it was enough under the statute that
opposition to war be held "with the strength of traditional religious con-
victions."' 20 In so ruling, Welsh effectively eliminated the requirement of
religious content for conscientious objector status: "If an individual
deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in
source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of con-
science to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs
certainly occupy... 'a place parallel to that filled by... God' in tradi-
tionally religious persons."'' As Justice Harlan emphasized in his con-
curring opinion, a contrary ruling would create serious constitutional
difficulties by treating religious claims more favorably than nonreligious
claims.'
22
Moreover, even apart from the constitutional problems raised by
discriminating on the basis of religious content, the Court has found suf-
ficient reason to protect individuals against coerced listening to govern-
ment messages in a nonreligious context.'23 In Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,'24 a state statute required a
woman seeking an abortion to receive certain information, including: (1)
a description of the medical risks associated with the abortion procedure
and with carrying the pregnancy to term, (2) the "fact that there may be
detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not accurately
117. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
118. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1981).
119. 398 U.S. at 337.
120. Id. at 340 (plurality opinion). Four members of the Court joined in the plurality
opinion, and Justice Harlan reached a similar conclusion through his reading of the First
Amendment. Id. at 367 (Harlan, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 339-40 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring). See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 3 n.37, reaffirming the
principle that a preference for religion over nonreligion, like a preference for one sect over
another, is unconstitutional. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). But cf. Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (invalidating the denial of unemployment benefits to a
claimant who refused Saturday work because of religious beliefs).
123. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169
(1986).
124. Id.
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foreseeable," (3) the fact that medical benefits might be available to her,
and (4) the fact that the father would be liable for child support.12
While recognizing the propriety of a goal of informed consent, Thorn-
burgh invalidated these provisions on the ground that "the State may not
require the delivery of information designed 'to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or childbirth.' 126 The Court found
that the "compelled information" was often irrelevant, might increase a
woman's anxiety and contained "poorly disguised elements of discour-
agement for the abortion decision." '127 Although the Court relied on ear-
lier abortion rulings rather than on the First Amendment, the
Thornburgh case clearly enforced the principle of uncoerced listening.
The thrust of the decision is that a woman seeking to terminate her preg-
nancy cannot be required to listen to the state's message about abortion
because freedom of choice can be undermined by government speech, as
well as by direct regulation. But if coerced listening threatens reproduc-
tive freedom, it can also threaten other constitutionally protected free-
doms. Thornburgh plainly suggests that the principle of uncoerced
listening is not limited to religious speech, and there is no plausible rea-
son to confine the principle to religion and abortion.
Other considerations also support the application of the principle of
uncoerced listening to nonreligious speech. First, it should be recalled
that the origins of the principle are found in Supreme Court decisions
which protect listener rights largely without regard to whether speech is
religious or nonreligious.12 The rulings in Barnette, Kovacs, Lehman
and Rowan were all directed at nonreligious speech.129 The cases dealing
with the listener's "right to receive"13 also concerned nonreligious
speech. Even Wisconsin v. Yoder 3 1 provided protection against nonreli-
gious governmental speech, albeit for the purpose of safeguarding reli-
gious values. This case law hardly suggests that the principle of
uncoerced listening should be confined to religious speech.
Furthermore, the basic rationale for restricting religious speech by
government is substantially applicable to cases of coerced listening to
government ideology. One of the First Amendment's major functions is
125. Id. at 2178-79.
126. Id. at 2178 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983)).
127. Id. at 2180.
128. See supra notes 45-92 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 45-54, 66-77 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
131. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
the protection of individual freedom of thought. 132 The First Amend-
ment affords this protection in large part through the prohibition against
abridging private communications. However, it is also possible for
speech to abridge communication. No one would doubt, for example,
that government use of loud speakers to drown out political opponents
could constitute an abridgement within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment. What the school prayer cases illustrate is that government speech
at low decibel levels can also have an unconstitutional "abridging" effect
when, though not literally drowning out private speech, it interferes with
freedom of thought.133 If freedom of thought is undermined by forced
listening to the government's religious speech, it can be similarly under-
mined-as in the Yoder case-by forced listening to the government's
nonreligious speech. To be sure, the Establishment Clause evinces a spe-
cial concern for religious advocacy, but that is not the only concern of
the First Amendment. Freedom of political thought is protected under
the Speech and Press Clauses,13 4 just as freedom of religious thought is
protected under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Jaffree case identified freedom of con-
science as "the central liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First
Amendment." 135 Freedom of conscience surely embraces religious be-
lief, but as a concept unifying the "various" clauses in the amendment, it
cannot easily be limited to religious belief.136
Admittedly, government speech can often be ignored or counter-
acted by numerous sources of private speech in the community.1 37 How-
ever, the danger of government overreaching is much greater in the
132. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 52-55, and cases cited therein.
133. Professor Mark Howe assessed the cases as follows:
In every case in which the Court has condemned voluntary religious exercises in the
public schools, there has been ... a sufficient element of social and psychological
coercion to justify a finding that liberty and equality are endangered. In those cases
in which the Court, by contrast, has tolerated a measure of public recognition of our
religious traditions, there has been a less significant-and sometimes an almost
wholly insignificant-impairment of liberty or dilution of equality.
M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 173 (1965).
134. See Bork, Neutral Principals and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
135. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
136. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), in which Justice Powell, writing for a four-
member plurality, stated that "affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, religious, or polit-
ical beliefs is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally com-
mitted to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice." Id. at 638.
137. M. YUDOF, supra note 95, at 91-92.
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context of a captive audience,131 particularly when, as in the case of
school children, the audience is young and impressionable.1 39 In these
circumstances, secular speech can undermine political and personal au-
tonomy in much the same way that vocal school prayer was found to
undermine religious autonomy. 14° At the core of both cases is the princi-
ple of freedom of thought, which is difficult to reconcile with coerced
listening to official ideology.14 1 Of course, the free expression clauses fo-
cus primarily on government restriction of speech, rather than on gov-
ernment exercise of speech. But one way to restrict speech, or at least
the effectiveness of speech, is to condition listeners to reject officially dis-
favored views.142 This is a threat which the Court has perceived in reli-
gious speech, and the same threat also exists in some nonreligious
speech. 143
138. Compare Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting of the Ten Commandments in
classroom held invalid) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (display of Nativity scene
in municipal shopping district upheld).
139. Examples of overreaching are plentiful. Professor Charles Lawrence recounts this
experience:
In the fourth grade I was one of two blacks in my class. Each week we began the
school assembly by singing Old Black Joe and The Caisson Song .... Were the
ritualistic singing of songs that demeaned my race and glorified the military any less
acts of confession than the flag salute in Barnette or the Bible reading in Schempp?
I survived these destructive socializing rituals and many others like them be-
cause I was fortunate enough to have parents who encouraged me to express my
feelings of rage and humiliation and who taught me how to fight in effective but
socially acceptable ways. Most children are not so lucky.
Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of
Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309, 328 n.64 (1980). Others have been exposed as
children to efforts by their teachers to direct them into career patterns that conformed with
racial or gender-based stereotypes. See, e.g., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 36-37
(1966).
140. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
141. At least two of the leading free speech theorists have recognized this problem and
have sought shelter in the First Amendment, although they have not addressed the issue in
detail. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 710 (1970) ("lIt is a
cardinal principle of the system of freedom of expression that no person can be compelled to
listen against his will"); Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of The Captive Audi-
tor, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 960, 967 (1953) (forced listening destroys "that unfettered interplay
and competition among ideas which is the assumed ambient of the communication freedoms").
142. See M. YUDOF, supra note 95, at 157, urging that the First Amendment be read "to
prevent the distortion of judgment of the people by government expression."
143. Although school children are captives for only part of the day, their parents often do
not know exactly what has been said or done in class. For this reason, and because of the
immaturity of children, rebuttal speech may not be a suitable remedy. The inadequacy of such
a remedy was acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Nevertheless,
the issue is complicated since a lack of education can also restrict freedom of thought. Thus,
education is both a stimulant and, in some instances, an impediment to freedom of thought.
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B. Limits and Remedies
The principle of uncoerced listening, even when applied to nonreli-
gious speech, will not preclude government from addressing a captive
audience. No one would suggest that a ninth-grader can resist instruc-
tion in mathematics simply by alleging that she is a captive auditor in an
algebra class. The rights of listeners, like those of speakers, are subject to
significant limitations. 1 " The difficult problem, of course, is to define the
limits on listener rights. As in defining a speaker's rights, the limits will
be determined only after a considerable period of time. It is still too early
to do more than outline some of the approaches available for setting lim-
its on the principle of uncoerced listening and providing remedies for
constitutional violations of the principle.
One approach to setting limits would be to distinguish between
value inculcation, which the Supreme Court has tacitly approved, 145 and
ideological indoctrination, which students might legitimately resist.
However, a distinction of this sort would be elusive, and perhaps judi-
cially unmanageable. The line between persuasion and coercion is diffi-
cult to discern when impressionable children are involved; and
conclusory terms like "inculcation" and "indoctrination" are unlikely to
aid analysis. Of course, if the distinction between ideological indoctrina-
tion and value inculcation is judicially unmanageable, both will be vul-
nerable to legal attack. This does not mean that value inculcation is
illegitimate. It means only that, as Barnette and Yoder make clear, the
First Amendment imposes limits on official prescription of values;1
4 6
whether the prescription is labeled "inculcation" or "indoctrination"
should be irrelevant.
An alternative, which would avoid such difficult line-drawing
problems, would be to follow the approach of Rowan v. Post Office De-
partment.147 In Rowan, the Court recognized the unrestricted power of
individual listeners to reject material they deemed offensive. In so doing,
the Court avoided "the appearance ... of governmental censorship"
148
and the need for tenuous line-drawing. But a policy of unrestricted lis-
144. It is important to recognize that the principle of uncoerced listening does not enhance
government power to regulate private speech. First amendment principles, of course, do not
apply to private intrusions upon listener freedom. Accordingly, the authority to regulate
nongovernment speech continues to be governed by Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971) (requiring proof that "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner").
145. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (dictum).
146. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-42 (1943); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 234-36 (1971).
147. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
148. Id. at 735.
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tener autonomy, although easy to apply, seems incompatible with a
sound system of public education. Unlike the mailings in Rowan, educa-
tion in the public schools is essentially a group enterprise and cannot
function if individual class members have an unqualified right to insulate
themselves from all materials that offend their sensibilities. This is not to
suggest that every student must participate in a particular program of
instruction. But those who participate should ordinarily do so on a con-
tinuing basis and should not absent themselves whenever they disapprove
of segments of the material under consideration.149
A third option would be to limit the listener's autonomy while in-
voking more familiar, and more manageable, judicial standards. This ap-
proach requires first, some definition of the area of legitimate listener
objection and second, an application of traditional first amendment stan-
dards to the listener's claim. The listener's right should arguably be con-
fined to good faith claims of conscientious objection to ideological
speech. 150 As in other first amendment cases, these claims would then be
measured against the state's interest in restricting individual freedom. 5'
This approach, while protective of listeners, seems both judicially man-
ageable and responsive to the needs of the educational system. Of course,
difficult problems remain and may be especially acute when judicial in-
tervention extends into the sensitive area of public classrooms. However,
the risks of intervention are not substantially different from those already
engaged under the Barnette and Yoder decisions.' 2
Once the Court adequately defines listener rights, it will be obliged
to fashion appropriate remedies for violations of the principle of un-
coerced listening. Arguably, this is the critical issue in the public school
context, since Pierce v. Society of Sisters" 3 recognized a constitutional
right to withdraw to private schools, and thereby raised a question as to
149. See infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
150. Federal courts have frequently applied each of these terms, except the reference to
"ideological speech." See, eg., Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S. 437 (1971). The term "ideological"
will require elaboration in future litigation but this task is no less manageable than that of
defining religion. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
151. Some commentators have suggested, for example, that training in democratic values
and preparation for citizenship, which provided a major impetus for public education, serves
overriding state interests. See Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a
Right to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. R v. 871,
879 (1977). The same might be said of some government speech to prison inmates or military
personnel since forced listening is relatively easy to justify when it is predicated on criminal
convictions or on enlistment in the armed services. See Kamenshine, supra note 95, at 1138.
152. See also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
153. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
whether less extreme remedies might be available. 154 Some commenta-
tors have proposed that public schools be required to give balanced treat-
ment to controversial subjects. 155 Proper enforcement of such a
requirement could alleviate the problem of coerced listening to ideologi-
cal speech.
It is questionable, however, whether the concept of balanced treat-
ment would be susceptible to judicial application. This concept serves as
a useful pedagogical tool for those engaged in the day-to-day operations
of the schools. But at least two major obstacles stand in the way ofjudi-
cial enforcement of balanced treatment. First, a requirement of balanced
treatment, like the distinction between inculcation and indoctrination,
might prove to be judicially unmanageable. Judges can determine
whether a Marxist view of history, or a feminist perspective, has been
included or excluded from a course of instruction; but whether a teacher
has properly balanced the treatment of the subject is a matter requiring
delicate academic judgments which lie far outside the scope of judicial
expertise. 156 Second, judicial enforcement of balanced treatment would
draw federal and state courts deeply into the administration of academic
programs. General oversight of the curriculum, and perhaps supervision
of the classroom, would be needed to determine whether a proper bal-
ance was actually achieved. Aggressive oversight of this sort is funda-
mentally at odds with the judiciary's limited role in the educational
process and with the long tradition of local control of public schools.157
A remedy that either prohibited the objectionable speech or excused
objecting students would avoid excessive judicial entanglement." 8 How-
ever, a blanket prohibition on speech would raise serious questions of
academic freedom159 and, when the listener's objection is based on reli-
154. The Pierce remedy may be quite adequate for financially-able families in metropolitan
areas. However, it is largely unavailable to the poor and to many families in rural areas.
155. See Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 522,
527-28 (1960).
156. See M. YUDOF, supra note 95, at 294, stating: "Experience with the fairness doctrine
is such that only the hopelessly optimistic would argue for its extension into other realms."
157. Judicial enforcement of a right of reply is beset with similar difficulties. See M.
YuDOF, supra note 95, at 292-93.
158. In some cases it might be the students' parents who object. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 229-30 (1972). The resolution of possible conflicts between parent and child is
beyond the scope of this Article.
159. The applicability of academic freedom to primary and secondary education has been
the subject of dispute. Compare M. YUDOF, supra note 95, at 215-18 with Goldstein, The
Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U.
PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976). But even if the concept of academic freedom did not apply to grade
school teachers, a blanket prohibition would interfere with the liberty of the students who
wished to hear the school's message.
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gion, could run afoul of Epperson v. Arkansas.16' A remedy of excusal,
on the other hand, does not present either of these difficulties. Academic
freedom carries no entitlement to a captive audience.1 6 ' And while Ep-
person bars curricular decisions motivated by conflict with religious val-
ues, the Yoder case requires the excusal of students on the basis of such
conflicts. 162 Read together, the Epperson and Yoder cases point toward
excusal as the appropriate remedy for a listener's religion-based claims,
and the same remedy seems appropriate for claims arising out of coerced
listening to secular ideologies. Indeed, this is the remedy which school
boards have voluntarily provided in many situations involving controver-
sial or highly sensitive subjects.1 63 Excusal of a student under narrowly
defined conditions should occasion no greater burden than that encoun-
tered in the discretionary excusal of students under current statutory or
administrative provisions."
Conclusion
In Jaffree, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of
vocal prayer in public schools but indicated that nonvocal prayer during
state-sponsored moments of silence is permissible, absent an official en-
dorsement of religious activity. The Court apparently based its acquies-
cence in silent prayer on the fact that listener rights are unaffected when
no words are spoken. However, the interest in protecting unwilling lis-
teners is not confined to school prayer and may extend to a broad cate-
160. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
161. At common law, parents were generally permitted to excuse their children from pub-
lic school instruction so long as the efficiency of the school and the rights of other students
were not threatened. See, eg, Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P.
49 (1921); School Bd. v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578 (1909).
162. Of course, Yoder involved excusal from the entire secondary school program rather
than from a portion of it. See infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
163. See generally L. KoTiN & W. AIKMAN, LEGAL FOuNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY
SCHOOL ATrENDANCE (1980). To be sure, the excusal of students from segments of a course
of instruction might create undue administrative burdens for the teacher or the school. But if
instead students are permitted only to be excused from an entire course, and if the grounds for
exeusal are narrowly defined, no such burden should result. See Hirschoff, supra note 151, at
936-39.
164. Recently, a federal district court in Tennessee ordered the excusal of school children
from a class in which they were required to read materials offensive to their religious convic-
tions. Mozert v. Hawkins County School Dist., 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.Tenn. 1986). That
decision, which protected religious beliefs by applying the Yoder rule to an individual course of
instruction, has received extensive press coverage, but not always much understanding. See,
ag., Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 8. This lack of understanding is due, not only
to familiar shortcomings of press accounts, but also to the court's failure to explain fully the
basis for its decision. Other cases, voicing similar objections to compulsory programs in the
public schools, are now pending in lower federal courts. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1986, at 96.
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gory of government speech. The implications of protecting listener
autonomy deserve close attention, but it is important to recognize that
the protection will be limited and will not inhibit the essential communi-
cation between government and uncoerced members of the public.

